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Abstract—Data sharing among multiple parties becomes in-
creasingly common today, so is the potential for data leakage.
As required by new data protection regulations and laws, when
data leakage occurs, one must be able to reliably identify the
leaking party. Existing solutions utilize watermark technology or
data object allocation strategy to differentiate the data shared
with different parties to identify potential leakers. However
the differentiation loses its effectiveness under several attacks,
including injecting noise into the data copy to weaken the
differentiation, or denying the reception of certain shared data.
Worse yet, multiple parties might collude and apply a set of
operations such as intersection, complement, and union to the
shared dataset before leaking it, making leaker identification more
difficult.
In this paper, we propose ActShare, a systematic solution
to provide reliable leaking source identification for leakages of
identifiable information. ActShare takes advantage of the intrinsic
properties of identifiable data and allocates data objects to
individual sharing parties by identifying attributes, uses oblivious
data transfer between the sender and receivers, and employs an
immutable ledger to log all data sharing operations. A knowledge-
based identification algorithm is proposed in ActShare to identify
leakers in data leakage. Our evaluation shows that, with a modest
amount of leaked data, ActShare can accurately (with accuracy
> 99%) and undeniably identify the guilty party(s) in cases of
non-collusive leakage, or collusive leakage by any number of data
receivers, or even leakage by the data sender.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sharing becomes increasingly common today; for
example, it becomes a common practice to outsource data
analysis to professional third-party suppliers to assist decision
making and market forecasting. At the same time, the potential
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information like Person-
ally Identifiable Information (PII) [19] also increases. As
the society becomes increasingly online, data confidentiality
becomes a major concern. New regulation and laws, such as
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [9] and
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [6] have come
into existence for data protection, especially for PII and other
identifying information, and violators can be fined up to 4%
of their annual worldwide turnover according to GDPR [29].
Therefore reliable leaker identification in data leakage is a key
enabler for the enforcement of new regulations.
The leaker identification problem in data sharing can be
described as follows: a data owner (called the sender) shares
its data with a number of agents (called receivers), where both
sides agree that the shared data should never be disclosed
to any third party. When a data leakage happens, offenders
must be identified. A number of solutions to this leaker
identification problem have been developed in recent years.
At this time, the basic approach is to differentiate the datasets
received by different receivers in the data sharing process.
For example, the sender can allocate different portion of data
across receivers [23], [22], [10], [17], or watermark the original
data [2], [28], [25], [31] before sharing it with each receiver.
In this way, the sender can trace the leaker(s) by matching the
data entries or checking the watermark of the leaked data.
However, the traceable differentiation loses its effectiveness
in identifying leakers in some cases. To be more specific,
the differentiation can be undermined, denied, or even abused
by the attackers. (i) Attackers can undermine the differen-
tiation through data manipulation (e.g., transformation and
randomization on numeric attributes, dropping certain columns
or rows); when there exists collusion among receivers, the
differentiation can also be removed via data comparison (e.g.,
only leak overlapping data). (ii) The differentiation can be
denied when there lacks the evidence of who has received
what. (iii) The traceable information can also be abused by
the sender to frame a receiver because the sender is aware of
the differentiation.
The aforementioned issues motivate the following ques-
tions:
1) Since the existing approach to data differentiation can be
spoiled by data manipulation or multiparty collusion, can
we leverage the properties that are intrinsic in the shared
data to build resilient leaker identification?
2) In order to prevent the sender from abusing its complete
knowledge about data sharing, is there a way to prevent
the sender from knowing the exact dataset it shares with
individual receivers?
3) Can we develop a truth-preserving solution that prevents
any party from lying or denying its actions in the event of
a data breach?
To provide robust data differentiation that cannot be easily
destroyed, denied or abused, we narrow down the problem
scope and focus on the leakage of a specific category of
datasets – those datasets that contain identifiable information.
In this paper we define identifiable information as any data
that can be reliably associated to an object, e.g., a user, a
product, or even a movie. Such information is carried in
dataset’s identifying attributes, which can be a phone number,
an email address, a SSN, a product identifier, and so on. We
believe that identifiable information is applicable to a wide
range of shared datasets. There is an observable property
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of the dataset that contains identifiable information; once
the identifiable information is removed or distorted, the data
becomes anonymized and thus is less harmful to privacy when
it is leaked.
In this paper, we propose ActShare, a data sharing system
with reliable leaker identification in identifiable information
leakage. Leveraging the property of identifiable information,
ActShare allocates data objects by their identifying attribute
across the receivers in a way that no single party is fully
aware of the allocation results; at the same time, nobody
can deny or lie about what data objects it has received.
More specifically, the design of ActShare includes three basic
components, answering the questions we raised above.
• Obliviously Allocating Objects by Identifying Attribute.
The sender organizes the raw dataset into data objects by
data’s identifying attribute(s) and then obliviously allocate
data objects among receivers.
• Recording the Data Sharing into an immutable Ledger.
ActShare logs the whole process of data sharing into an
immutable ledger. In the event of a data leakage, the ledger
prevents any party from lying or denying what data objects
have been transferred/received.
• Identifying Leakers based on Leakers’ Knowledge When
a leakage happens, ActShare can identify the leakers by
reversely inferring the knowledge of the leaker(s) from the
leaked data objects. A statistical test called the binomial test
is utilized in ActShare’s identification process.
We have implemented a prototype system of ActShare
using 1-out-of-2 OT [7] and a private blockchain-based ledger.
We evaluated ActShare by using a real-world dataset (which
contains more than 100 million database rows that can be
grouped into more than 17000 data objects). Our results show
that, by checking a modest number of leaked data objects,
ActShare obtains > 99.9% detection accuracy in the cases
of (i) a guilty sender, (ii) a non-collusive guilty receiver, or
(iii) a collusion of corrupted parties. After the allocation,
each receiver obtains a dataset with a smaller size than the
original data and in ActShare, the amount of received data is
configurable.
Contributions The contributions of our work are twofold.
1) Leveraging the intrinsic property of identifiable informa-
tion, we propose ActShare, a data sharing system with
reliable leaker identification. To the best of our knowledge,
ActShare is the first data allocation based leaker identifi-
cation mechanism that is capable of identifying a guilty
sender or a number of collusive leakers.
2) We implemented a prototype of ActShare and evaluated its
effectiveness and impact of data allocation, showing that
ActShare can accurately and undeniably detect collusive or
non-collusive leaker(s).
Roadmap In the rest of the paper, we introduce the system
model of our work in Section II and provide an overview of
ActShare in Section III. After that, we introduce the design
of each component in ActShare in Section IV, V, and VI.
We evaluate our work in Section VII and discuss the trade-
off and configuration parameters in ActShare in Section VIII.
We introduce the related work in Section IX and conclude our
work in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider the following problem. In a
data sharing scenario, we assume there is a data sender S
and N data receivers R1, R2, ...RN . The dataset being shared
contains identifiable information. When the shared data is
found unexpectedly (e.g., found in an unauthorized place), the
goal is to identify the party/parties responsible for the leakage.
A. Threats Model
Using the data sharing scenario described above, we define
the threats model as follows. From the system design perspec-
tive, we treat the unintentional and intentional data leakage as
the same type of attack.
• Non-collusive Guilty Receivers We assume that a receiver
can leak partial or entire set of its received data, and there
may be more than one (non-collusive) receivers whose data
is found from the leaked dataset.
• A Guilty Sender In the real world, the data sender may
disclose its information unintentionally, e.g. due to dishonest
employees or vulnerable company firewall. It is also possible
that, when a leakage occurs, a sender might frame a receiver
by using its complete knowledge about the data sharing.
• Multiparty Collusions Multiple parties may collude to
gain advantages over the leakage identification system and
escaping the responsibility. Specifically, corrupted parties
can share their received dataset and leak the combination
of their datasets to the public. With datasets from multiple
parties, we assume the combination includes: (i) taking
the union, intersection, or complement of any number of
available datasets and (ii) randomly picking a number of
data objects. We consider the cases when the sender also
participates in the collusion. However, we assume the sender
does not collude with all the receivers (i.e., no party is
honest).
• Data Manipulation A malicious party can manipulate its
data to circumvent the identification. Carefully-added noise
keeps the value of the data while ruining the differentiation
made on the data. Though approaches like content-based
matching can be used to evaluate the likelihood between
a manipulated dataset with the original one, it is hard to
provide the evidence to prove the matching is right.
• Repudiation After data leakage, both the sender and re-
ceivers may deny the facts of what has been sent and re-
ceived. For example, to escape the responsibility, a receiver
who leaked the data may deny the receipt of a specific
portion of the data and the sender may lie about what has
been sent.
Specifically, in respect of the collusive leakage, our pro-
posed system aims to capture each collusive receiver who
contributed to the leakage. If a corrupted receiver R does not
contribute to a leakage, that is, if other collusive receivers can
have sufficient knowledge to make such a leaked dataset even
without this R’s participation, ActShare cannot identify R as
a leaker.
B. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions when designing Act-
Share.
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We assume the exis-
tence of PKI. Specifically, we assume S and receivers have
installed each other’s public key certificates. This can be
accomplished by the pre-configuration before the data sharing
or through other out-of-band means.
Existence of Identifying Attributes. When it comes to
a data that contains identifiable information, we assume there
exists at least one identifying attribute in each data object. In
ActShare, the identifying attribute will be used to distinguish
each data object in the data.
Adequate Number of Data Objects We assume there are
adequate data objects for the allocation so that each receiver
can still get enough data objects. With insufficient number of
total objects or with too many receivers, ActShare’s allocation
may violate the purpose of data sharing and the identification
process may suffer from a high error rate. We also assume an
adequate number of leaked objects are known to ActShare’s
identification algorithm in the event of a leakage. More details
about ActShare’s constraints will be discussed in Section VIII.
III. ACTSHARE OVERVIEW
Our proposed system functions by allocating data objects
by data’s identifying attribute across receivers with Oblivious
Transfer (OT). The use of OT prevents the sender from fully
knowing the allocation result, so the sender cannot easily frame
a receiver. During the sharing, the whole process will be logged
immutably into a ledger, preventing any party from denying
or lying about the data allocation. In the event of a data
leakage, ActShare can identify all leakers with high accuracy
by reversely inferring leakers’ knowledge from the leaked data.
ActShare consists of three main components.
1. Data Object Allocation. In ActShare, the allocation
of data objects is accomplished by the data sender and the
oblivious sharing. In particular, the sender will first orga-
nize the original dataset into data objects identified by their
identifying attribute and then prepare the objects for each
receiver. After that, a form of OT is applied for the sender
to share specific collection of objects to each receiver. As a
result of the allocation process, each receiver will get their
specific collection of data objects and the allocation result
keeps unknown to every party in the system.
S R1Dataset 1
Original 
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Figure 1: Data Allocation with the ledger
2. Ledger-based Sharing Logging During the data shar-
ing, the sender and the involved receiver will log their network
communication into a ledger. More specifically, when a party
receives a message from the other side, it will hash the received
message with its own randomness, digitally sign the hash,
and then append the signed hash with some meta information
into the ledger. The ledger provides high data availability and
immutability of the logged information. The result of using a
ledger is that the entire sharing process is logged. These logs
will be referred by the leaker identification algorithm when a
data leakage happens.
leaked data
Ledger
3Leaker 
Identification
Arbitrator
Knowledge-based 
Algorithm
Figure 2: Leaker Identification
3. Knowledge-based Leaker Identification. In a data
leakage, an arbitrator (e.g., a court, a notary office, or even
a smart contract) will trigger the leaker identification process.
In the leaker identification, all the involved parties provide
the arbitrator with their received data objects and the keying
material used in OT. The arbitrator confirms their claimed
objects by checking against the ledger. With all the claimed
received objects verified, the arbitrator then triggers the algo-
rithm to identify all the leakers. In detail, the algorithm will
start with the hypothesis that a party is not guilty. Under this
hypothesis, the algorithm uses inferential statistics to evaluate
the probability of having such a leaked dataset, thus judging
whether the party is guilty or not.
The notations used in this paper are listed in Table I.
Table I: Notation Table
N number of data receivers
Data collection of all the data objects
Data′ leaked data objects
Recvi data objects received by receiver Ri
Uniquei data objects that are only received by Ri
Dropi data objects dropped by Ri in the OT
u number of exclusive objects for each receiver
IV. DATA ALLOCATION IN ACTSHARE
In ActShare, the data allocation is accomplished by two
steps: (i) data preprocessing and (ii) oblivious sharing between
the sender and receivers. The preprocessing is to organize the
original dataset into objects by data’s identifying attribute(s)
and further divide the objects into an Exclusive Objects (EO)
and a Common Objects (CO). As indicated by its name, each
object in EO is assigned to a specific receiver while objects
in CO will be shared with all the receivers. This step is solely
done by the data sender. The second step is to transfer the data
objects from the sender to each receiver with OT.
After the data allocation, each receiver’s data objects have
the following two properties.
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Figure 3: Data Allocation
1) Uniqueness and Collusion Resistance Each Recvi is a
different collection from other receivers and a combination
of datasets from any number of corrupted parties is also
distinguishable.
2) Data Manipulation Resistance The allocation is resistant
to data manipulation operations unless the attackers entirely
strip or distort identifying attributes from the received data.
A. Data Preprocessing
In order to turn raw data (e.g., database, key-value storage)
into objects, the sender first needs to select the identifying
attributes as the basis of the organization. Considering a dataset
that contains identifiable information, there are two possible
scenarios: there exists a single identifying attribute or multiple
identifying attributes. In the first scenario, the single attribute
will be selected as the basis, while in the second case, a
concatenation of all the identifying attributes should be used.
For example, in the Netflix Prize Data [20], there exists one
single identifying attribute, movie name/ID, and thus it can be
used to identify objects (Figure 4). As another example, in the
Patient Heart Disease Data [14], each patient entry contains
a Social Security Number (SSN) and the patient’s full name.
In this case, the sender should use SSN and the full name
(Figure 4) together as the basis of classification so that even
when a leaker strips one attribute, ActShare can still match the
objects by checking the other attribute.
... ...... ...
...
...
...2005-03-144Isle o..
3Dinosa.. 2005-12-19
DataRatingMovie ...
...
...
...... ......
0Name2SSN2
Name1SSN1 1
SexFull NameSSN
Identifying Attribute
Netflix Prize Data Heart Disease Data
Figure 4: The Selection of Identifying Attribute(s)
Using identifying attributes as the basis, the sender then
organizes the original data into objects and further into EO
and CO. This process is shown in Figure 3. To divide the data
objects into EO and CO, the sender will first randomly shuffle
the objects and allocate the first u×N objects as EO while the
rest as CO. In EO, each u number of objects is specifically
assigned to each receiver. In ActShare, u is a configurable
parameter and it can be zero, that is, letting all the data objects
be in CO.
B. Oblivious Sharing
Once finishing the preprocessing, the sender will share
u objects from EO and |Data| − uN objects from CO to
each receiver using the Oblivious Transfer (OT). During this
process, data objects will be further allocated by OT and the
final allocation keeps unknown to the sender, thus preventing
the sender from framing an innocent receiver.
An OT protocol is a cryptographic protocol in which the
sender transfers many pieces of information to a receiver
but remains oblivious to which piece has been received. At
the same time, the receiver learns nothing but the selected
information. In a classic 1-out-of-2 OT, the sender inputs
two messages m0 and m1 while the receiver has a secret bit
b ∈ {0, 1}. The receiver will learn mb while b keeps unknown
to the sender at the end of the OT. A 1-out-of-2 OT can be
extended to a more general k-out-of-n OT where the receiver
can select k out of total n messages.
In ActShare’s design, the OT is used as a black box and
it can be replaced by any other constructions of OT or OT
extension. In this paper, we use the 1-out-of-2 OT [7] (hereafter
called Simple OT) proposed by Tung et. al as an example to
illustrate the sharing process. For each receiver, the sender
first prepares all the data objects to send, including u objects
from EO and |Data| −uN objects from CO. Then the sender
randomly shuffles these objects and groups these objects into
a number of pairs < m0,m1 >, where m0 and m1 contain the
same number of objects and are the same in size (bit padding
can be used here). Using M to represent the number of pairs,
the sender generates 2M AES keys and encrypts m0 and m1
with two AES keys AesK0 and AesK1 respectively. As shown
in Figure 5, for each pair, the sender then obliviously transfers
AesK0 and AesK1 to the receiver. After that, the receiver
can only decrypt mb based on its choice b ∈ {0, 1} while the
sender cannot learn the value of b. Such OT will be repeated
for M times in total to finish the data sharing. Importantly,
during the sharing, the keying material used in OT should
be kept by both sides. In detail, the sender should keep the
original data objects, AesK0, AesK1, and x (red rectangles
in Figure 5) while the receiver should keep the copy of b and
y (blue rectangles in Figure 5).
S R
AesK0
AesK1
Y = g   if b = 0y
Y = g g   if b = 1yx
b
C0 = E(K0, AesK0)
C1 = E(K1, AesK1)
K0 = H(Y  )x
K1 = H((Y/X)  )x AesKb = D(Kb, Cb)
mb = AES_D(AesKb, Eb)
X = g x
Kb = H(X    )y
E0 = AES_E(AesK0, m0 )
E1 = AES_E(AesK1, m1 )
H(m) is a hash function. H(m, key) is a keyed hash function.
AESE(key,m) and AESD(key,m) represent the AES encryption and
decryption on message m with key key. E(key,m) and D(key,m) are
XOR-based encryption/decryption functions used in SImple OT.
Figure 5: Oblivious Sharing with Simple OT [7]
As a result of the oblivious sharing, data objects are further
allocated among all the receivers. Specifically, using k-out-of-n
OT, each receiver will randomly receive about kn of u objects
from EO and kn of |Data| − uN objects from CO. Because
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of the random shuffle and k-out-of-n OT, (i) each receiver will
have a different object collection, (ii) each collection contains
some objects that are never received by any other receivers,
and (iii) the combination of any number of collections is
also identifiable. These properties will be later utilized in
ActShare’s leaker identification.
V. USE OF LEDGER IN ACTSHARE
In ActShare system, the ledger provides strong evidence
of what objects have been shared, ensuring non-repudiation
and making the leaker identification results more reliable. To
be more specific, during ActShare’s oblivious data sharing, in-
volved parties will append the keyed hash of received messages
as receipts into the ledger. The ledger will immutably keep the
logged information and at the same time, provide high data
availability. When a data breach occurs, logged information
will be referred to prevent any party from denying or lying.
A. Design of the Ledger
In this work, we present a proof-of-concept ledger based
on a private blockchain, which is called ActShare ledger.
The blockchain is shared among the sender, receivers, and/or
third parties (e.g., a court, a notary office) through a simple
broadcast protocol. Since it is controlled within a closed circle
and is not designed for a cryptocurrency, there is no need
for a wasteful consensus function like Proof-of-Work (PoW).
Instead, in this work, we take a similar design to Proof-of-
Authentication [32], [33] proposed by Z. Zhang et. al, where
a digital signature is attached to each block in the chain.
SRi
L
signed 
by Ri
signed 
by S
Witnesses
signed 
by S
signed 
by Ri
Sharing
Gating Function
Figure 6: A proof-of-concept ledger
To this end, each block contains three components: (i) a
hash value of its payload as the block ID, (ii) the payload
which contains the logged data, the ID of the preceding block,
and the meta information (e.g., producer ID, timestamp, etc.)
(iii) a signature over the block ID, which is generated by block
producer’s private key. The validation of a block is to ensure
the correctness of the ID and the validity of the signature.
When the ledger is running, a simple gating function is
used in the following way. Given that the ledger is used by a
limited number of parties and new blocks come only during
the sharing between the sender and a receiver, we simply let
the sender trigger each round of block appending. Specifically,
there are four steps.
1) When the sender is ready to share its data with a receiver,
the sender broadcasts a notification to all the parties so as
to clear the channel.
2) Subsequently, when the receiver or the sender receives a
message, it appends the receipt into the ledger by broad-
casting its record to all the involved parties.
3) Once the sharing is finished, the sender broadcasts another
notification.
4) After that, other parties can optionally append witness
blocks whose logged data is empty, serving as a witness
of the sharing, thus increasing the immutability of logged
data.
In case of any number of simultaneous new blocks, the block
signed by a party with a higher user ID (the highest ID number
subjects to the smallest ID) will be adopted as the next official
block.
When receivers’ privacy is a concern (e.g., receivers may
be business competitors), pseudo names can be used in order
to hide the real world identities of the receivers. Also, well-
known public key pairs should also be avoided. Under this
background, the sender can play the role of a central trust
anchor, through which each receiver registers a pseudo name
with a newly generated key pair. A receiver can also learn other
receivers’ certificates from the sender so that the receiver can
successfully verify other receivers’ blocks.
B. Logging the Data Sharing with the Ledger
In the data allocation phase, both the sender and receivers
need to log their communication into the ledger as immutable
receipts. Specifically, whenever the sender or a receiver re-
ceives a message from the other side, it calculates the message
digest with a keyed hash function. The key used in hash is a
piece of randomness created by each party. Using the data
sharing example shown in Figure 5, when a receiver gets E0,
E1, and X from the sender, the receiver will calculate the
message digest over these three values with a keyed hash
function, e.g., HMAC. After that, the receiver generates a
new block by (i) generating the payload with the receipt,
the identifier of the latest block in the ledger, and the meta
information, (ii) calculating the hash of the payload as the
block identifier, and (iii) appending a digital signature over
identifier into the block. With the newly generated block, the
receiver broadcasts this block to all the involved receivers.
Similarly, when the sender receives the reply from the receiver,
it also generates a new block and appends it to the block by
broadcast. Both the sender and receiver keep their keys used
in the keyed hash secretly unless in the leaker identification in
the event of a data leakage.
C. Analysis: Log Immutability and Availability
In this section, we provide rationales for why our proof-
of-concept ledger can provide immutability and availability of
the logged information.
The ledger provides data immutability through blocks that
are signed and chained together. The content of each block
is protected by the producer’s digital signature, and therefore
no party can modify the logged information other than the
producer itself. Furthermore, when a party appends a new
block into the ledger, by the design of the blockchain, it
locks the previous records by the hash chain: unless the whole
change is changed together, a single change in any previous
block will lead to broken pointers in all the following blocks.
These two features can successfully ensure the immutability
of the data recorded in the ledger.
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The ledger achieves a high data availability through data
replica among involved parties. Specifically, the blockchain is
shared among all the involved parties in a distributed way.
Therefore, one or several node’s outages will not ruin the
availability of the logged data.
VI. LEAKER IDENTIFICATION AFTER DATA LEAKAGE
ActShare identifies leakers by analyzing the leaked data
and finding the involved parties whose knowledge is sufficient
to create such a leaked dataset.
To provide some intuitive ideas of how ActShare’s identi-
fication works, we show four leakage examples in Figure 7.
The dots in the figure are the leaked data objects while each
circle represents data objects received by each receiver. The
intersection of circles are the objects that are received by
multiple receivers. As shown, if leaked data objects are like
Figure 7a where objects are uniformly distributed in receiver
R3’s circle, we can easily infer R3 to be the leaker. When
leaked objects are like Figure 7b, the sender is guilty because
some leaked objects have never been received by any receiver
(dots not falling into any circle). If objects are distributed
in a specific section as shown in Figure 7c, it is trivial to
deduce the leaked data is from Recv1∩Recv3∩Recv{2 , which
means all three receivers collude in the leakage. Figure 7d is a
more complicated scenario where leaked objects are all from
Recv1 ∩ Recv3 but with a non-uniform distribution. Under
this scenario, we can still infer that R2 participates in the
collusion because R1 and R3 should not have the knowledge
to distinguish objects that belong to R2 without R2’s help.
Following this idea, the leaker identification phase in
ActShare consists of three simple steps.
1) Opening Secret. The involved parties provide the arbitrator
with their keying material used in OT with the randomness
used in receipt logging.
2) Replaying Sharing. With the opened parameters, the ar-
bitrator is able to replay the sharing process between the
sender and any receiver and confirm the obtained results
with the logged information in the ledger.
3) Identifying Leakers. After replaying the sharing process,
the arbitrator knows the exact allocation of data objects
among receivers. According to the knowledge used to
construct the leaked data, ActShare evaluates the innocence
of every involved party and identifies the leaker(s) with a
very low error rate.
The first two steps are to ensure that the arbitrator can get
the correct information of the sender and each receiver’s
knowledge while the third step is to identify the leakers based
on each involved party’s knowledge.
Since the first two steps are straightforward, for the remain-
ing of this section, we will describe the third step: given the
exact data allocation, how to (i) identify a non-collusive leaker
(the sender or a receiver), and (ii) identify all the collusive
leakers.
A. Identifying Non-collusive Leakers
Algorithm Summary ActShare takes the following steps to
identify each non-collusive leaker, which can be the sender or
a receiver.
1) The algorithm first figures out each receiver’s (i) unique
data objects that are never received by other receivers and
(ii) the objects that are dropped during the OT.
2) For each receiver, the algorithm detects (i) the overlap
between leaked objects and unique objects and (ii) the
overlap between leaked objects and dropped objects. If the
first is nonempty but the second is empty, we consider this
receiver guilty.
3) Finally, to verify the sender’s honesty, the algorithm calcu-
lates the objects that are only known to the sender (i.e., not
received by any receiver). If there exists an overlap between
sender-only objects and leaked objects, we consider the
sender guilty.
Algorithm Rationales Based on the data objects allocation,
both the sender and each receiver have a number of objects
that are never received by any other parties, and therefore
these objects can serve as the clue of non-collusive leakers
(the sender or non-collusive receivers). We use Uniquei to
represent the objects that are only received by a receiver Ri
and SenderOnly to refer to those objects that are not received
by any receiver. Moreover, objects dropped by each receiver
Ri during the OT , which are denoted by Dropi, are not known
to any party.
Therefore, we have the following statements hold when
there is no collusion. Firstly, Ri is a leaker by a large
probability if leaked data objects Data′ contain objects that
are also in Uniquei but no objects from Dropi. Specifically,
Uniquei can be calculated by
Uniquei = Recvi ∩
(⋃
j 6=i
Recvj
){
(6.1.1)
Secondly, S must be a leaker if Data′ contains objects from
SenderOnly. Specifically, from the data allocation process,
we have:
SenderOnly = (Drop1 ∩ EO1)
∪ (Drop2 ∩ EO2)
...
∪ (DropN ∩ EON )
∪ (Drop1 ∩Drop2... ∩DropN ) (6.1.2)
where EOi represents the u exclusive objects allocated to Ri.
Pseudo Code and Proof Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code
of the ActShare’s algorithm of non-collusive leaker identifica-
tion.
We prove the effectiveness of the Algorithm 1 here.
Specifically, we first prove that in a non-collusive leakage,
leaker’s unique objects can be observed by a high probability
(Lemma VI.1 and Lemma VI.2) with an adequate number of
leaked data objects. Based on this, we prove the algorithm
can successfully identify the non-collusive leakers with a high
success rate.
Lemma VI.1. If there exists a non-collusive guilty receiver
Ri and |Data′| leaked objects are found, Data′ will contain
objects from Uniquei with a probability P as shown in
Equation (6.1.3).
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Figure 7: Knowledge-based Leaker Identification (Circles are receivers’ knowledge and red points are leaked data objects)
Algorithm 1 Identifying a Non-collusive Leaker
Require:
1: Leaked dataset Data′
2: Each receiver Ri’s data objects, Recvi
3: Data objects dropped by Ri in the sharing, Dropi
Ensure: Non-collusion leaker set L;
4: Calculate each receiver’s unique objects: Uniquei
5: for i from 1 to N do
6: if Data′ ∩ Uniquei 6= ∅ then
7: if Data′ ∩Dropi 6= ∅ then
8: Add S into L
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: Calculate objects known to the sender only: SenderOnly
13: if Data′ ∩ SenderOnly 6= ∅ then
14: Add S into L
15: end if
Proof: Because there is no collusion, Ri has no idea
that which objects are in Uniquei, so we can consider
that Data′ contains objects randomly from Uniquei and
Recvi − Uniquei. Therefore, we have the probability of ”at
least one object of leaked dataset Data′ is in Uniquei” to be:
P (Data′ ∩ Uniquei 6= ∅) =
1−
(|Recvi|−|Uniquei|
|Data′|
)(|Recvi|
|Data′|
) (6.1.3)
According to the data allocation process, when a k-out-of-n
OT is being used, we have
|Uniquei| = ku
n
+
k
n
× (n− k
n
)N−1 × (|Data| −Nu)
where N is the total number of receivers, and u is the size of
objects form EO that are only allocated to Ri.
Importantly, P is large enough even when Ri only leaks a
small portion of data objects from Recvi. For example, using
1-out-of-2 OT and with 3 receivers in total, when M = 20000
and u = 0, the probability P exceeds 99.99% even when Ri
leaks 1% of its received data (i.e., 100 data objects). Therefore
it is strong enough to believe the detection results.
Lemma VI.2. If there exists a non-collusive guilty sender
S and |Data′| leaked objects are found, Data′ will contain
objects from SenderOnly with a probability P as shown in
Equation (6.1.4). If S leaks enough data objects, the leaked
data will contain SenderOnly.
Proof: The proof is the same as Lemma VI.1. Using a
k-out-of-n OT, the possibility for S to successfully remove all
the SenderOnly data objects is
P (Data ∩ SenderOnly 6= ∅) =
1−
(|Data|−|SenderOnly|
|Data′|
)( |Data|
|Data′|
) (6.1.4)
where M is the size of all the data objects and l is size of
leaked dataset Data′. According to the data allocation process,
we have:
|SenderOnly| = (1− k)Nu
n
+ (
n− k
n
)N × (|Data| −Nu)
Similarly, P is large enough even when S only leaks a small
portion of data objects from Data.
Theorem VI.3. Algorithm 1 can identify all non-collusive
leakers with success rate shown in Equation (6.1.3) and
Equation (6.1.4).
Proof: Code line 4-11 is to identify non-collusive guilty
receivers and line 12-15 is to identify a guilty sender. Accord-
ing to Lemma VI.1 and Lemma VI.2, Algorithm 1 can detect
the sender with success rate shown in Equation (6.1.4) and
detect the non-collusive receiver with success rate shown in
Equation (6.1.3).
B. Identifying Collusive Leakers
Algorithm Summary ActShare identifies collusive leakers by
the following steps.
1) The algorithm first represent all the data objects with a
vector, in which each index represents a description (called
a pattern) of each receiver’s state of receipt and the value
of each element represents the number of objects that fall
into this set. Similarly, the algorithm transforms all leaked
objects with another vector.
2) For each receiver, the algorithm then infers whether this
receiver contributed to the collusive leakage by comparing
the leaked-object vector with the all-object vector with a
statistical test called binomial test. Through the comparison,
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the object distribution in leaked-object vector should not be
significantly different from that in all-object vector if this
receiver does not contributed to the leakage.
Algorithm Rationales In a more complicated scenario where
multiple receivers collude, the leaked data can still reflect
leakers’ knowledge because the leakers cannot know the data
objects received by honest receivers. Following this principle,
ActShare is able to identify all leakers by the following
checking. For every single party Ri, if it contribute nothing to
the collusion, the leaked objects that are in Recvi and not in
Recvi should satisfy an expected distribution. For example, the
distribution should be statistically close to 1:1 when 1-out-of-2
OT is used in the sharing. If there is a significant difference
from the expectation, Ri should be a collusive leaker.
To facilitate the explanation of the algorithm, we first
introduce the Pattern Matrix Pat[2N ][N ], where each row in
the matrix is the reverse binary expression of its row index.
Therefore, a Pattern Matrix is like:
Pat[2N ][N ] =

0 0 ... 0 0
1 0 ... 0 0
0 1 ... 0 0
...
0 1 ... 1 1
1 1 ... 1 1

In each row j, we define a single element Pat[j][i] = 1
to represent Ri received a data object and Pat[j][i] = 0
otherwise. For example, a row with all ones represents a pattern
Recv1∩Recv2∩ ...∩RecvN while a rows with all zeros refers
to Recv{1∩Recv{2∩...∩Recv{N . In the Pattern Matrix, we define
two rows k and k′ are paired on Ri if these two rows are only
different at i’s slot. For example, Pat[0] and Pat[1] are paired
rows on R0.
Since all data objects can be represented by a pattern row
in Pattern Matrix, we can transform any dataset into a Dataset
Vector, denoted by V ,
V [2N ] = [a0, a1, ..., ai, ..., a2N ]
where each element V [i]’s index i indicates the pattern in
Pattern Matrix’s row i and its value represents the number
of data objects that fall into this pattern. For example, V [0] is
the number of objects that are never received by any receiver
and V [1] is the size of objects that are only received by R0.
Similarly, in a Dataset Vector, we call two elements are paired
if they are indexed by two paired row indexes in the Pattern
Matrix.
By transforming the whole dataset and the leaked dataset
into Dataset Vectors V and V, V can reflect the object distribu-
tion of the leaked dataset while V provides the expected object
distribution between any two paired patterns. Importantly, for
two paired index k and k′ on receiver Ri, if Ri makes no
contribution to the leakage, V [k] : V [k′] should be similar as
V[k] : V[k′]. In order to scientifically measure whether the
difference is significant enough, we employ a statistic test,
binomial test [26], to obtain the p-value [30]. Here, p-value
indicates the probability of having V [k] : V [k′] under the
hypothesis that Ri is honest. When p-value is less than a
pre-defined value α (e.g., α = 0.05), it is considered that
the hypothesis does not hold and thus Ri contributed to the
leakage.
As mentioned, a noteworthy fact is that ActShare cannot
identify a corrupted receiver when this receiver makes no
contribution to the leakage, that is, other corrupted parties can
still have sufficient knowledge to make such a leaked dataset
even without this receiver’s participation.
Pseudo Code and Proof Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code
of the ActShare’s identification algorithm for collusive leakers.
Algorithm 2 Leakers identifying algorithm.
Require:
1: Leaked data objects
2: The allocation of all the data objects
3: A significance level: α, α = 0.05 by default
Ensure: Leakers set L with an accuracy value A
4: Transform all data into a Dataset Vector V
5: Transform leaked data into a Dataset Vector V
6: Initialize a vector PV alues[N ] = {1,1,...,1}
7: for i from 1 to N do
8: for k from 1 to 2N do
9: Find k′ which is paired with k
10: P = V[k]/(V[k] + V[k′])
11: p valuei = Binomial Test(V [k], V [k] + V [k′], P )
12: if p valuei < α then
13: Add Ri into L
14: PV alues[i] = min(PV alues[i], p valuei)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: Calculate accuracy as A =
∏
i∈L(1− PV alues[i])
Now we prove the effectiveness of Algorithm 2 with a
brief proof. Specifically, we first prove that when a receiver
contributed to the leakage, its contribution can be reflected
by the object distribution of two paired elements in Dataset
Vector (Lemma VI.4). After that, we can prove the correctness
of Algorithm 2 (Theorem VI.5).
Let V be the Data Vector for the leaked dataset and let V
be the Data Vector for all the data objects.
Lemma VI.4. If there exists any paired patterns k and k′
on Ri where distribution of objects in V [k] and V [k′] has
a significant difference from V[k] and V[k′], we draw the
conclusion that receiver Ri contributed to the leakage with
an error rate of the p-value obtained in the binomial test.
Proof: We give a proof by contradiction. Assuming Ri
does not contributed to the leakage, since the corrupted re-
ceivers cannot know Recvi, their leaked data randomly con-
tains both objects received and not received by Ri. Importantly,
the distribution of objects in V [k] and V [k′] follows the
distribution of V[k] and V[k′] because corrupted receivers
cannot tell these two patterns apart. This contradicts the
statement that the distribution of objects in V [k] and V [k′]
has a significant difference from V[k] and V[k′]. Therefore
receiver Ri is corrupted and has contributed to the leakage.
The error rate is the probability that a significant difference
exists when Ri is honest, which is represented by the p-value
obtained from the binomial test.
Theorem VI.5. Algorithm 2 can identify all the collusive
receivers with accuracy obtained in code line 18.
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Proof: In Algorithm 2, line 15 to line 22 is to check
whether there exists a paired k and k′ whose distribution in V
has a significant difference from V for receiver Ri, . According
to Lemma VI.4, each corrupted receiver who contributed to
the leakage can be identified with an error rate to be the p-
value. Therefore, for each identified corrupted leaker j, the
probability of giving the correct result is 1− pvaluej , where
pvaluej is the smallest p-value among all the p-values for
each ¡k, k’¿ pair in which a significant distribution difference
is observed. The accuracy for the whole algorithm is the
probability that the algorithm make a right identification on
each captured party, and therefore the accuracy should be∏
j∈L
(1− pvaluej)
where L is the set of all leakers captured by Algorithm 2.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate ActShare with the prototype
implementation of ActShare’s knowledge-based algorithm and
the simulation of the data allocation in terms of the following
two aspects.
1) We evaluate ActShare’s effectiveness in identifying leakers
in different scenarios: a non-collusive guilty receiver, a
guilty sender, and a group of collusive parties.
2) We formally describe the data loss caused by ActShare’s
allocation and investigate the impact of loss using Heart
Disease Data [14] and OpenFlight Data [21].
It shows that with total 20,000 objects and 6 receivers,
ActShare is able to identify all the leakers with accuracy
more than 99.99% in any scenarios if more than 5% of the
objects are leaked and used in the identification algorithm.
With Heart Disease Data and OpenFlight Data, we utilized
existing analyzing approaches to process a full-size dataset and
a dataset obtained after ActShare’s allocation. Our simulation
shows that similar results can be observed with two different
datasets.
A. Accurate Leaker Identification
We first evaluate ActShare’s performance by changing the
quantity of leaked objects used by ActShare. At the same time,
we fix the total numbers of data objects and receivers, and use
the most well-studied 1-out-of-2 OT in the sharing.
Evaluation Settings We let the value of |Data| be 20,000,
the total number of receivers N be 6, and u = 0. In the
data sharing phase, 1-out-of-2 OT is used in the evaluation.
We evaluate ActShare’s detection algorithm in the cases of
a single non-collusive guilty receiver, a guilty sender, and a
group of collusive leakers, respectively. Specifically, in the
collusive leakage scenario, we evaluate the detection when two,
three, and six collusive receivers. In each case, we randomly
try three different types of dataset combinations, which consist
of one or more intersection, complement, and union operations.
Plot Notation The x axis indicates the fraction of the leaked
data objects over a leaker’s dataset or a processed dataset made
by collusive receivers. Specifically, we formally describe the
meaning of x using x = 0.01 as an example.
• In a non-collusive leakage, it means 1% of guilty receiver’s
objects Recvi are leaked and used in ActShare to identify
the leakers.
• In the case of a guilty sender, it means 1% of the common
objects are leaked and used in ActShare to identify the
leakers.
• As for a collusive leakage, x = 0.01 means 1% objects
from the combined dataset (e.g., after a set of collusive
operations) are leaked and used in ActShare.
Therefore, in the collusive leakage, the fraction is smaller
than the fraction of leaked objects of each receiver’s data
objects. The y axis indicates the error rate of the detection
results. Error rate 1 means the number of leaked objects is
not sufficient for the identification algorithm to identify the
leaker(s) while error rate 0 indicates that the algorithm can
identify all the leakers undoubtedly. In the plots, we let the
maximum accuracy precision to 99.999999%, in other words,
the minimize error rate is 1× 10−8.
Evaluation Results As shown in Figure 8, we confirm that
the more data is leaked and used in ActShare, the higher
identification accuracy is in all three scenarios (i.e., a non-
collusive guilty receiver, a guilty sender, collusive parties). In
Figure 8a and Figure 8b, we can observe similar identification
accuracy in both cases. This is because when u = 0, we have
|SenderOnly| = |Uniquei| for any i < N and the difference
comes as the result of the definition of leakage ratio: a
receiver’s ratio denominator is |Recvi| while the sender’s ratio
denominator is the quantity of all data objects. In Figure 8c, it
shows that when number of collusive receivers increases, there
is only a slight decrease in the detection accuracy. It’s because
when more receivers contribute to the leakage, the combined
dataset usually becomes smaller in size, e.g., Recv1 ∩ Recv2
has a bigger size than Recv1 ∩Recv2 ∩Recv3. Moreover, we
find the accuracy will not change much when different types
of combination operations are made in the collusive leakage.
As a summary, with 20,000 data objects and 6 receivers, we
observe that ActShare’s detection can accurately identify all
the guilty parties even when 5% objects are used in ActShare.
B. The Impact of ActShare: Use Data Analysis As Examples
Inevitably caused by the allocation, ActShare will reduce
the dataset from its original size to the size of Receivedi
for each receiver. According to the allocation process, we
can represent the data loss in the allocation by the following
equation.
Lossalloc =
n− k
n
× |CO|+ (N − 1)× u
=
n− k
n
× |Data|+ n+ kN
n
× u
As an example, with 1-out-of-2 OT and u = 0, each receiver
will receive 12 of the whole dataset. An OT with a higher
k
n
will lead to a lower data loss.
In this section, we investigate the impact of data loss caused
by ActShare’s allocation. However, given that each real world
dataset is very various in their size, quality, and other features,
it is impossible to investigate the impact of the data loss on
the received data’s value. Therefore, in this work, we use
data analysis as an example application scenario. We select
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Figure 8: Leaked Data Amount v.s. Detection Error Rate (Fixed OT and u)
two typical datasets that contain identifiable information from
public resources and investigate the impact of ActShare on the
analysis results.
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Figure 9: Data Analysis on Heart Disease Data
The first dataset is Patient Heart Disease data [14] provided
by UCI. The original Heart Disease data contains patients’
SSNs and full names as the identifiable information, but these
attributes have been stripped in the public available version
for privacy concerns. For the purpose of evaluation, we add
back these two attributes with randomly generated values.
Identified by SSN and full name, the dataset contain about
300 data objects in total, which is a very small dataset and
the analysis results are supposed to be more sensitive to the
size of the data. In our evaluation, we perform the disease
prediction analysis using the existing analysis mechanisms [15]
and compare the analysis results obtained from a full-size
dataset and a dataset obtained from the sharing simulation
with 1-out-of-2 OT and u = 0. The analysis tools used in the
evaluation are based on common classification algorithms in
machine learning, including Linear Regression (LR), k-nearest
neighbors algorithm (KNN), Support Vector Machine (SVN),
Naive Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), and Random Forest
(RF). As shown in Figure 9, even though the total data objects
are small in size, the analysis can still give the similar results
with a difference between 0.5% to 6% using a half-size dataset.
The second is the Worldwide Flight Route data [21]
from OpenFlights.org. Each row in this database contains a
departure airport name/ID and an arrival airport name/ID of the
route, serving as the identifying attributes used in ActShare. In
contrast with the small heart disease dataset, Flight Route data
is large in its number of data objects (more than 67k routes
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Figure 10: Data Analysis on OpenFlights Data
and 6k airlines). Similarly, using existing analysis tools [18],
we perform airport analysis based on a full-size dataset and
a half-size dataset obtained from the ActShare simulation. As
shown in Figure 10, the analysis results on both full-size data
and the processed data are the same about the top 10 busiest
airline hubs, while the density obtained from the processed
data is 48% - 52% of the density obtained from the raw data.
This is expected because a half-size dataset is used.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Basic Trade-off: Identification Accuracy v.s. Data Loss
The principle of our proposed work is to distinguish each
receiver’s dataset via allocation and a fundamental trade-off is
between ActShare’s identification accuracy and the data loss.
In detail, the larger the data loss is, the more differentiation
each receiver’s data objects will carry and consequently the
more accurate the identification will be. The optimal balance
in the trade-off is to (i) control the data loss so that the received
dataset is sufficient to achieve the application goals (e.g., data
analysis) and at the same time, (ii) the differentiation among
receiver’s objects are large enough for ActShare to identify the
leakers.
As investigated in Section VII-B, the number of data
objects received by each receiver mainly depends on the size of
u and the form of OT. Also, by properly setting the parameters
in ActShare, a good balance can be found that achieves both
acceptable received data size and good detection accuracy. To
this end, in the next subsection, we evaluated ActShare by the
simulation using different forms of OT and different u.
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Figure 11: Detection Error Rate v.s. the Form of OT (Fixed u)
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Figure 12: Detection Error Rate v.s. The value of u (Fixed OT)
B. System Sensitivity to Configuration Parameters
In the design of ActShare, there are two configuration
parameters. One is which form of OT to use and the other one
is the value of u, which is the number of exclusive objects for
each receiver. To learn how these two parameters will affect the
performance of ActShare, we perform a number of simulation
of ActShare using three different forms of OT: 1-out-of-2 OT,
2-out-of-3 OT, 3-out-of-4 OT and four different values of u:
0, 100, 300, and 1000. In the simulation, we set the number
of receivers to 6 and total data objects to 20,000.
As shown in Figure 11, in the case of a single receiver
leakage (Figure 11a) or a sender leakage (Figure 11b), an OT
with a higher kn results in lower identification accuracy. This is
expected because ActShare identifies each non-collusive leaker
by its unique objects. To be more specific, according to the
equations of |Uniquei| and |SenderOnly| shown in the proofs
of Lemma VI.1 and VI.2, when a higher kn is used, less objects
are unique to each receiver and the sender, thus resulting in a
lower identification accuracy. The decrease can be explained:
when there is a large kn and only a small percentage of objects
are leaked, there is a non-negligible chance that none of unique
objects are included in the leaked objects. For example, using a
3-out-of-4 OT, only when more than about 40% of the objects
are leaked and used by ActShare, the accuracy of identifying
a non-collusive guilty receiver becomes larger than 99%. As
is noticed, SenderOnly drops much faster than Uniquei, and
thus the accuracy decrease is more obvious in Figure 11b.
However, as observed, under the circumstance of a collusion
leakage, the higher the OT’s kn is, the higher the detection
accuracy is. This is because with a higher kn , each receiver
receives more data objects and each combination will contain
more objects, making the statistical difference between sample
and expectation more significant.
Regarding the impact of value of u, as shown in Figure 12,
in the scenario of a guilty sender (Figure 12b), the identifica-
tion accuracy goes lower while in other scenarios (Figure 12a
and Figure 12b), a higher u leads to a higher accuracy of
the identification result. It’s because a higher u makes each
receiver obtain more unique objects and the size of receiver’s
total objects also becomes larger, helping ActShare to identify
non-collusive guilty receivers and collusive receivers. On the
other hand, since u’s value is much smaller than the size of
Common Objects (CO), the size of SenderOnly becomes
smaller as u becomes larger. Therefore it is harder to identify
a guilty sender.
From the above simulation on the impact of OT and u, it
shows when an OT with a higher kn is used, it becomes less
accurate to identify a guilty non-collusive receiver or a guilty
sender, but by properly setting the value of u, such accuracy
loss can be compensated.
C. The Overhead of ActShare
In ActShare, without using OT extensions, M times of OT
is needed to obliviously transfer M pairs of < m0,m1 > to
a receiver. The value of M depends on two factors: (i) the
total number of objects to transfer to each receiver, which is
u+ |Data| − uN and (ii) the number of objects contained in
each pair. Considering each pair < m0,m1 > only contains
two objects (i.e., m0 and m1 are two data objects), we have
M =
u+ |Data| − uN
2
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Figure 13: The Impact of the Total Receiver Number (Fixed OT and u)
. Correspondingly, we can obtain Table II. As shown, the
numbers of OTs, AES encryption operations, and the round
trip times with Simple OT [7] are all linear to the quantity
of data objects. As an optimization, the value of M can be
greatly reduced by utilizing OT extensions [13], [16], [3], [4]
or increasing the size of objects contained in each pair.
Table II: Crypto Operations and Network Round Trips
Number of OTs M, O(|Data|)
AES Encryption 2M, O(|Data|)
Round Trips [7] 1.5M, O(|Data|)
Identification O(N ∗ 2N ), N is the total number of
receivers
By the pseudo code in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, the
complexity of ActShare’s identification algorithm is dominated
by the total number of receivers as listed in Table II.
D. Investigate the Assumption of Adequate Data Objects
In this section, we investigate the relationship between
ActShare’s performance and the adequacy of the data objects,
which is the third assumption as listed in Section II.
The word “adequacy” has two meanings in this assumption.
First, an adequate number of leaked objects are discovered and
used in ActShare’s identification process. In Section VII, we
have revealed the relationship between identification accuracy
and the number of leaked objects used in the algorithm.
The second meaning is that there are adequate data objects
to allocate among the receivers. Like all the other allocation-
based leaker identification mechanisms, ActShare will in-
evitably lead to data loss in each receiver’s data due to the
allocation. When there are many receivers or very few data
objects, each receiver will get a small number of objects
after the allocation. In Section VII, we have formally defined
the data loss in ActShare. In this section, we further inves-
tigate ActShare with inadequate data objects for allocation.
Specifically, we make the number inadequate by adding more
receivers in the simulation. Similar to the previous simulation
setting, we set the total object number to 20,000, the OT to
1-out-of-2 OT, and u to 0. As shown in Figure 13, when there
are totally 3, 6, and 9 receivers, the error rate goes higher when
the total receiver number is larger. Under the circumstance of
3 collusive leakers out of 9 receivers, ActShare can identify
the leakers with accuracy more than 99%, only when about
30% objects are used in the algorithm.
E. Collusion Between the Sender and Receivers
So far, we haven’t elaborated the case when the sender
colludes with one or more receivers. This is because ActShare
can identify all the leakers who have contributed to the leak-
age, including the leaker. Specifically, there are two possible
situations in such collusion.
1) The sender contributes to the leakage. However, the only
contribution that the sender can make are the objects that
are not received by its associates (the collusive receivers)
due to the sender’s limited knowledge. For example, when
the sender S and receivers R1 and R2 colludes, what S
knows more than R1 and R2 are the objects in Data −
Recv1∪Recv2. Therefore, the leakage will contain objects
from the sender in this case. By the Lemma VI.2, there is a
large chance that leaked objects overlap SenderOnly and
thus the sender will be captured by Algorithm 1. At the
same time, all corrupted receivers who contributed to the
leakage, can also be captured by Algorithm 2.
2) The sender does not contribute to the leakage, under which,
there is no need (and it is difficult) to capture the sender.
The real leakers who contributed to the leakage can be
captured by Algorithm 2.
Moreover, when a sender colludes with one or more receivers,
they still cannot frame other receivers because they have no
knowledge of others’ data objects due to ActShare’s oblivious
sharing.
IX. RELATED WORK
Data leakage problem has been explored for years [27],
[8]. Past works in this domain cover the leakage prevention,
leakage detection, and leaker identification. In terms of the me-
dia of information, the existing works have covered structured
data (e.g., rational database, spreadsheets), textual data (e.g.,
contracts, reports), and multimedia (e.g., images, video).
Our work focuses on the leaker identification problem in
identifiable information leakage, which is under the category
of structured data. Existing leaker identification solutions to
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the same issue can be divided into two big categories: (i) data
watermarking, and (ii) data object allocation across receivers.
A. Watermarking
In the first category [12], the data sender alters the noise-
tolerant attributes or embeds hidden information into the data
before sending it to each receiver so that each distributed copy
is watermarked. By associating the watermark contained in
the leaked data with the receivers, the data sender is able
to identify the guilty party. This scheme was first proposed
by Agrawal et al. [2], [1] and was further explored in later
works [28], [31], [24], [25], [34], [11], [5].
However, as pointed out in many existing works [2], [12],
[5], it is hard to effectively make a watermark on structured
data, because it is trivial for attackers to further alter the
structured data to spoil the watermark compared with other
types of media. For example, an attacker may undermine the
watermark by simply removing or adding noise to certain
attributes in the dataset (sometimes even without ruining the
main value of the dataset). Even worse, a group of collusive
parties can compare their received copies and figure out the
watermarked data or the location of the hidden information.
Consequently, these will lead to unexpected detection results,
thus making it hard to be the evidence used in a court of law.
B. Data Object Allocation
First proposed in Panagiotis and Hector’s work [22], [23],
the second category allocates data objects among receivers so
that each receiver will obtain a different data object collection
from others. When leaked data is found, the sender can
utilize the receiver-objects mapping to evaluate each receiver’s
probability of data leaking. Fake but realistic data objects can
also be created to facilitate detection. Following this direction,
Ishu and Ashutosh proposed a guilt detection mechanism [10]
that uses directed bigraph to allocate data objects to receivers.
However, existing allocation mechanisms also have several
issues when used in the real world. First of all, the allocation
can be disrupted by data manipulation and collusion among
receivers, by which corrupted receivers can learn the allocation
and circumvent the detection by leaking the common objects.
To be more specific, a leaker can add noise to each data objects
so that each object becomes less identifiable by the sender.
Furthermore, multiple receivers can even collude together and
strip the special data objects that are used to uniquely identify
each receiver.
Secondly, existing allocation approaches didn’t consider
the scenario where the data sender itself may leak the data
intentionally or unintentionally. This leads to several issues
that hurt the usability and reliability of existing systems. For
example, the sender can frame a receiver because it knows
this receiver’s data and thus can leak those data on purpose.
Similarly, a guilty receiver can also blame the sender when a
data breach happens.
Furthermore, rare existing systems provide the evidence of
the data sharing process, and thus involved parties may deny
what has been received/shared to escape their responsibilities
when data is leaked.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the leaker identification problem
in data sharing with identifiable information, and propose
ActShare, a data sharing system with reliable leaker iden-
tification. Compared with the existing solutions, ActShare
allocates data objects obliviously across receivers, immutably
logs the sharing process, and accurately identifies leakers with
a knowledge-based algorithm. The use of OT prevents the
sender from knowing the exact allocation of data objects to
individual receivers, and immutable logging of the entire data
sharing process provides undeniable evidence of received data
objects. In the event of a data breach, ActShare can accurately
identify all the leakers using ActShare ’s knowledge-based
algorithm even when guilty parties leak only a modest number
of objects. Moreover, we also use data analysis as an example
to show that the data size reduction caused by ActShare is
controllable and has limited impact on the data value.
Our work shows that building accountability (proactive
security) into the data sharing can greatly facilitate the leaker
identification in case of a data leakage. This will in turn prevent
malicious parties from illegally selling or disclosing sensitive
information. Our design also suggests that there is an urgent
need for a ledger system to keep immutable records; however,
existing cloud-based systems lack the immutability support
while popular distributed ledger systems used in cryptocurren-
cies are too costly to be feasible. We leave as our future work
the design of a general-purpose distributed ledger and sharing
of more generic datasets (may or may not contain identifying
attributes).
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